The following is a book review of Alvin Plantinga’s book God, Freedom, and Evil.

Alvin Plantinga is a graduate of Yale University. He spent his life specializing in and teaching logic and philosophy. In his book, God, Freedom, and Evil, Plantinga discusses the reasonableness of religion. In the time in which this was written (and perhaps even until this day) the idea of the reasonableness of religion is something at which secular elites scoff. Plantinga plumbs the depths of atheological argumentation in order to show the best his interlocutors have to offer. Plantinga shows these supposed nails in the coffin are simply cubes in a shape sorting toy. The secular arguments seem to work and have substance but are mere child’s play rather than offering any definitive destruction of religious belief. In order to accomplish this feat, Plantinga uses careful definition, development of crucial concepts, and cutting logic especially surrounding the idea of plausible worlds.

Summary

In the introduction, Plantinga gives the thesis and scope of his work. Plantinga is not trying to prove religion or Christianity, but rather to show that, “religious belief is rationally acceptable” (2). Many philosophers try to prove particular religious propositions (i.e., “God exists”) yet fall short. Plantinga deals with probability rather than certainty to prove reasonableness to those who would rather scoff at those who have taken a “leap of faith” to reject elementary observation. Plantinga gives the scope of his argument by narrowing it down to natural theology and atheology. He explains that for an example of natural atheology he will use the problem of evil and for an example of natural theology he will use the ontological argument (3).

One of the biggest attacks against religion from what Plantinga calls “atheologians” (i.e., those philosophers who conclude belief in God is irrational or unreasonable, 3) is surrounding the supposed problem of evil (7). Plantinga gives Hume’s position on the matter that because evil exists, God is either malevolent or impotent (10). Thus, atheological philosophers claim that theists who believe in a good God contradict themselves due to the presence of evil in the world. At this, Plantinga gives an explanation of what a contradiction truly is and defends that these beliefs are not explicitly or implicitly contradictory. He does this by inferring a set of propositions from philosopher John Mackie’s argumentation. Then he begins to show the unreasonableness of these propositions by using counterexamples concluding that there is no formal or implicit contradiction in the belief that both a good God and evil exists.

Next, Plantinga works to show that there is not only no contradiction, but also no inconsistency between God’s and evil’s existence. To do this, he uses Augustine’s proposal of free will: “As a runaway horse is better than a stone that does not run away because it lacks self-movement and sense perception, so the creature is more excellent which sins by free will than that which does not sin because it has no free will” (27). This sets up Plantinga’s free will defense which he describes as, “[God] can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so” (30). He defines free will in a libertarian fashion then begins to address critiques of this view especially in regard to the “best possible world.”

It is argued by philosopher G.W. Leibniz that, “this world, the actual world, must be the best of all possible worlds” (33). Plantinga uses syllogisms based on possible worlds to show that there are worlds (i.e., contradictory worlds) which God cannot actualize. He says that, given an individual’s free will, suppose there is a certain state of affairs which leads said individual to go wrong with a moral decision (this person commits evil/omits good). God cannot actualize a world with this state of affairs in which this creature now does not commit a moral evil (40-44). Therefore, because of human freedom, God cannot logically actualize any world that he might please—which Plantinga calls, “Leibniz’ Lapse” (44).

Then Plantinga begins to argue more to the point questioning if God could create a world with moral good and no moral evil. The important assumption in this section is that if such creatures are not free then they have no moral capability. So for a person to do moral good, he must be free to do it on his own volition and vice versa. Plantinga argues that if there is in one potential world a state of affairs (which he broadens to “maximal world segment”) which leads a particular person to freely commit a moral evil, then any possible world that God actualizes has the possibility for such a state of affairs to come about in which said person would create a moral wrong (47-49). This malady for the said individual Plantinga calls “Transworld depravity” (48). Plantinga argues that if every person is significantly free then there exists a state of affairs in some possible world in which they will go morally wrong. And so transworld depravity—or going morally wrong—is a part of every free creature’s essence. “If every essence suffers from transworld depravity, then it was beyond the power of God himself to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil” (53).

Given this fact, Plantinga moves on to discussing the reasonableness of the amount of evil in the world. Interestingly, he classifies both moral and natural evil as a creaturely evil. He usus Augustine to support the idea that Satan and his demons are the free creatures behind all the natural evils (again, he is not claiming he himself believes this but using it because it is not unreasonable; 58). Opponents argue that the best possible world would have more good than evil. However, Plantinga argues there is no “best possible world.” He argues with the analogy that there is no greatest prime number (61). Plantinga says this free will defense, “shows that the existence of God is compatible. . .with the existence of evil” (64).

Plantinga then goes on to explain briefly some other atheological arguments. He explains that verificationism is self-defeating (66). He spends more time in explaining the relationship between divine omniscience and human freedom. The supposed contradiction is that God could have false knowledge if such a person is truly free; however, Plantinga dismisses this by saying that God’s omniscience means he can have no false belief (71). After all this, Plantinga concludes “that natural atheology doesn’t work” (73).

Finally, Plantinga gives three classic arguments for the existence of God: cosmological, teleological, and ontological. He defines each one classically, then gives popular critiques. With the cosmological and teleological, he concludes that the critiques are correct. However, with the ontological, he modifies it by using additional plausible worlds. He removes “being” from being a quality. He argues from the possibility of one world to the conclusion of every possible world: “There is a possible world in which maximum greatness is instantiated” (111). He argues that it follows that maximum greatness in one possible world would require that in every possible world. This leads to God’s existence in every possible world.

Critical Evaluation

Plantinga certainly accomplishes his objective. Again, it’s important to distinguish his objective from what people may claim the objective should be. As in, most when approaching this topic believe the objective is to prove God or religion beyond any doubt. And perhaps, some may argue the objective should be to prove that God or religion is true beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, Plantinga’s objective is simply to prove that religious belief is rationally acceptable (2). The problem here is that the culture surrounding Plantinga (and some remnants continuing on today) had already decided that all religious reasoning was either void or irrational. This assumption formed a mote around the idea that God exists. In other words, the discussion of God’s existence would not even exist (esp. in Plantinga’s day) because the zeitgeist was such that any such discussion is frivolous or ridiculous. And so, Plantinga’s objective is to drain the mote to broach theistic discussion.

In Plantinga’s view, the main obstacle to overcome is the problem of evil. Here again, Plantinga is clear that he is not setting about to give a theodicy, but a defense. His point is that the existence of evil does not make theism irrational (7). Or to state it positively, God has a reason for permitting evil, and just because that reason is unknown does not make theism irrational (8-9). Plantinga argues that God’s allowance of evil brings about some greater good. As an example, he says an act of heroism in the face of evil that inspires others to act in such a way can only take place in the face of evil (23).

This “good state of affairs” that Plantinga primarily envisions is that of human freedom which he defines as, “free to perform an action and free to refrain from performing it” (29). Plantinga does an excellent job proving that there are logical limits to what God can do. For example, God cannot make a married bachelor or a square circle (15). Then he proves that it would be a logical contradiction for God to create a free world that only produces goodness. And although this may not necessarily be the definitive reason why God allowed evil (as in Plantinga stresses this is not a theodicy), it certainly accomplishes his goal of making theism reasonable.

Furthermore, when Plantinga approaches what he calls “natural theology” he also shows the reasonableness of theism by being honest with the classical proofs. He shows his willingness to allow logic and rationality to dictate his understanding of the existence of God rather than biases. For example, he is willing to dismiss major proofs for God’s existence that many theists hold onto dearly. For the teleological argument (the argument from design), Plantinga agrees with Hume’s critique that the apparent design does not necessarily conclude in the God of the Bible. He says every intelligence everyone has experienced has a body and therefore one may conclude that the intelligent creator of the universe is, “dependent upon physical objects in various ways, and had parents” (84).

So, when Plantinga approaches and remakes the ontological argument, one knows he is doing his best to do so with intellectual honesty and serious reflection of its critiques. The way he refines the ontological argument is excellent as well. Plantinga, again using plausible worlds, considers the fact that it is possible that maximum greatness exists in a world. Conceivably, this is certainly a possibility. He follows that for it to truly be “maximum greatness” it could not just be in one possible world, but all possible worlds (109-112). Any logician would have to say that these arguments are valid. And yet, he is still willing to admit that some may not find the argument sound because they do not accept the first premise (112). Therefore, Plantinga, in logical fashion, is honed in on his target that religious belief is rational and does not get distracted by an attempt to move to the next step.

Some people express frustration with devoting time and getting invested in a story just for the author at the end to announce that the entire narrative was just a dream. In some ways, this frustration can be felt with Plantinga’s work, but in a different way. Fortunately, Plantinga does not wait until the end of the work to disclose his own beliefs; however, he does frequently use premises that he does not personally hold in order to make proofs for the rationality of theistic beliefs. For example, when discussing Satan and his cohort as the force behind natural evil Plantinga insists, “The Free Will Defender, of course, does not assert that this is true; he only says that this is possible” (58). Certainly, this still achieves Plantinga’s goal that religion is based on rational belief; however, it still leaves the audience wondering, “What if it is not true? What then would be the explanation?” Arguing in probability, though achieving the author’s goals, leaves the audience with questions rather than answers.

A great majority of the book revolves around a particular understanding of free will. Free will is defined as the ability to perform or refrain from a certain action (29). A compatibilist view of freedom is quickly discussed (in a few paragraphs) and dismissed as “implausible.” And Plantinga concludes that section with, “So I shall say no more about that objection here” (32). Plantinga’s whole view of human freedom elevates the will to a level of authority it does not possess because the “why” of a decision is never considered. For example, when Plantinga discusses why Maurice may or may not take his oatmeal (42-44), Plantinga includes certain aspects within a “state of affairs” that are relevant to his choice: “He hadn’t had oatmeal lately, that his wife will be annoyed if he rejects it. . .” (42). These things within the “state of affairs” seem external to Maurice. Plantinga considers a “psychological condition” which in the way he paints it still seems to be outside of him (44). However, the will is not divorced from one’s affections or rationality in the way Plantinga seems to paint it. Whether Maurice takes the oatmeal or not depends heavily on his thinking and desires at the time. Maurice’s will is enslaved to his desires and rationality. He may take the oatmeal not because he wants it but to appease his wife; nevertheless, he still acts according to his desire. He still reasons through why he makes the decision that he makes. Plantinga so separates the will from the rest of the human person that it seems to become its own governor. In Plantinga’s eagerness to assert the freedom of the will he ignores the question of why someone does what he does. Therefore, “free agents” in the Free Will Defense either make their decisions arbitrarily or their decisions are determined by a particular “state of affairs.”

In an example of this “state of affairs” determinism, Plantinga gives a syllogism defending “transworld depravity.” He states in the final premise, “If S` were actual, P would go wrong with respect to A” (48). Even though it is the case that “S` includes P’s being free with respect to A,” it is difficult to see how S` is not the cause of P’s going wrong. Furthermore, if the human will is as free as Plantinga seems to make it, then it would be easy to conclude that the essence of a human person is simply a sum of their decisions. However, this would demand the question, “from where do these decisions come?” This could quickly result in the old nature versus nurture debate. And if one’s decisions are the result of one’s upbringing (or nature), could it really be argued that such a person is significantly free to perform or refrain from a particular action? Plantinga’s arguments place too much weight on the human will than it can bear.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that all of the arguments must be thrown out. Perhaps instead of arguing that God gave his creatures a freedom only centering on the will, perhaps one could argue that he gave a freedom of prioritization. A person (P) wants, reasons, and decides based upon assumptions and priorities they have at a particular time (say T₁) of performing or refraining from action (x). There is freedom in knowledge (and specifically in accepting premises to be true or false), affections, and will. However, it is difficult to determine which of these factors are essential in the action that plays out. And perhaps these three factors all vary in importance depending on P’s priorities. Hence x at T₁ is not determined by P’s will alone, but a combination of P’s will, affection, and reason. None of these things negates Plantinga’s arguments, but hopefully refines them. Because P can go morally wrong with x even before T₁ takes place (say, at T₀). At T₀ P is self-deceived about premise A and wants to go morally wrong by x. Therefore, P experienced freedom before T₁ when x took place. Therefore, freedom is found in more than the will alone.

Conclusion

None of the precision about where freedom is found for a human person negates Plantinga’s argumentation or reasoning for two major reasons: first, Plantinga is arguing from a realm of plausibility rather than actuality; second, Plantinga argues that freedom of will entails inevitable evil. No matter where that freedom is located (whether in the will, desire, reasoning, or prioritization), the arguments still stand. Evil, even transworld depravity, is plausible if freedom is centralized in some other human faculty (or all of them) other than the will.

Nonetheless, Plantinga’s goal was not a treatise on human will. He uses the freedom of the human will to prove the rationality of theistic belief. Plantinga certainly achieves his goal of showing theistic belief to be reasonable in spite of atheological critics. Readers will find plausible answers for the supposed problem of evil. The dialogue on the proofs for God brings one a step closer to the reasonableness of God’s existence. Any reader would benefit from the relatable illustrations and demanding syllogisms to come to the Plantinga’s conclusion that theism deserves a seat at the table of intellectual dialogue.