The Use of the Term “Person”
When exploring the Trinity, this is especially important for the term “person.” Prosopon in Greek and persona in Latin was an early term adapted to describe the threeness in God. Metaphysical and etymological assumptions about this term affect the way the interpreter approaches the raw biblical data. The original connotations of the terms in the original language do not carry over to modern English. Prosopon has to do with “face” or “appearance” and persona would refer to the mask a play actor would wear to play multiple roles. The mask analogy was perfect for Modalistic Monarchianism, but the orthodox users of the term were careful to differentiate their definition from that heresy. In fact, Augustine (in Latin) and the Cappadocians (in Greek) were both critical of the term. [1] Augustine continued to use the term seeing the fault in the finitude of human language to have a better metaphysical term to describe what was previously mysterious. The Cappadocians settled with hypostasis which corresponds to subsistence. In fact, Boethius uses the term “subsistence” to define person.[2]
Sanders argues that “person” in its original use was used to describe the metaphysical reality of the eternal relations which subsists in the “God who sends God and God.” [3] Karl Barth gives the long usage of the term and warns against those who, “ascribe a separate I-center with a separate consciousness and will and content to Creator, Son and Spirit respectively.”[4] Barth argues to do away with the term, “in order to believe what the church has always believed.”[5] The problem of course in modern studies of the Trinity is that person is understood as univocal. That is, the concept of human personhood is identical to divine personhood.[6] Holmes traces how this univocal understanding was developed from the extremes of Leonardo Boff and Miroslav Volf to the reasonableness of Alvin Plantinga. Holmes writes (esp. concerning Plantinga), “The theological question of analogy is, as far as I can observe, never raised and the assumed answer would always seem to be the language refers univocally to the divine and the created.”[7]
Therefore, assuming the univocality of personhood would affect the approach to Scripture and also the interpretation of biblical data. As an example of this, Wolfhart Pannenberg defines the eternal relations of the intrinsic Trinity on the basis of the historical relationship in time between the Father and the Logos ensarkos. [8] In other words, the intrinsic Trinity is defined by the economic Trinity. Pannenberg approaches biblical data concerning how Jesus incarnate interacted with the Father to define what there relationship is eternally.
Assuming univocality between human and divine personhood has translated into even in modern times in defense of the social Trinity. The social Trinity assumes that a human person acts, wills, desires, has its own center of conscious, and so on; therefore, so does a divine person. Instead of defining the intrinsic Trinity with the economic, those holding to the idea of the social Trinity believe the intrinsic Trinity is undefinable. For example, advocates deny that monogenes is essential to the eternal, divine person of the Son (the Logos incarnandus). William Lane Craig argues, “Christ’s status of being monogenes has less to do with the Trinity than with the Incarnation.”[9] This is a complete denial of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed which states that Jesus was, “. . .begotten of the Father before all the ages. . .”[10]
Denying essential, eternal Sonship also makes Hebrews 1 an impossibility rather than a mere paradox. R. B. Jamieson discusses how the Father addresses the Son as Son saying, “In the catena of [Hebrews] 1:5-14 ‘Son’ is a divine designation.” [11] Holmes goes on to defend that Hebrews teaches that the eternal second person of the Trinity is ontologically the Son while being titled the Son at his enthronement. He argues for the Son’s ontological and eternal relation to the Father from “radiance” and “exact imprint” in Heb. 1:3. He argues for the Son’s messianic receiving of the title “Son” (as the son of David) from “You are my son” in Heb. 1:5. He writes, “Hebrews; deliberate twofold use of ‘Son’ not only reflects the Son’s divinity and his human messianic vocation but exhibits the fit between the two.” [12] Hebrews 1 goes back and forth between divine, essential sonship and economic complete sonship. Hebrews 1:6 mentions the bringing of the “firstborn into the world.” And so, the Son is “firstborn” temporally before becoming incarnate and before inheriting the messianic title “Son.”
A person approaching 1 John 4:9b (which states, “ὅτι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ ἀπέσταλκεν ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸν κόσμον”) with a social Trinity preunderstanding will deny that the object of the perfect ἀπέσταλκεν can truly be described by μονογενῆ when the sending specifically εἰς τὸν κόσμον takes place. Commentator Stephen Smalley notes, “In vv 9 and 14 the verb is used in the perfect tense (ἀπὲσταλκεν), suggesting an action (of God) in the past which has a lasting effect. . .”[13] The past is temporally located as “into the world.” Therefore, this sending takes place prior to the incarnation when the Son is already in the world. In the view of the social Trinity, the perfective aspect of “sent” cannot truly apply to the monogenes until after the incarnation. And so, holding a preunderstanding of a modern definition of person as univocal to the triune person has a radical effect on the understanding of Sonship throughout Hebrews as well as the grammatical interpretation of 1 John 4:9.
Proper Theology Proper
If monogenes is only true of the Logos ensarkos, then it follows that the title Son would only be true of the Logos ensarkos. If this is the case, then what distinguishes the Father from the Son is not relation, but personality. In fact, Craig goes so far as to argue that it does not matter which person in the intrinsic Trinity plays which role whether “Father” or “Son.”[14] The social Trinity distinguishes the persons by personality. But, how is “person” distinguishable from “being?” In fact, if any member of the social intrinsic Trinity could have chosen to “play the role” of Father, then their intrinsic identities are interchangeable except for their separate willing, center of consciousness, and so on. And if each person has a separate will and center of consciousness can it truly be said that they are “one being?”
Theology proper creates safeguards that prevent the erasure of the distinctions between the economic and intrinsic Trinity. Because the fullness of God dwells in Christ (Col. 2:9), whatever propositions make God who he is also must be true of the divine nature of the Son (and, by implication the other divine persons). Both aseity and immutability are essential in what makes God who he is. Immutability is the fact that God cannot change. Criag’s description of the eternal persons as ill-defined implies both mutability and seity. If it did not matter, as Craig argues, which person “played” each role, then the person who “played” the Father changed into the Father (mutability). Interestingly, the divine person of the Son did not change in the incarnation. Rather, the immutable divine person added a human nature without any mutation. But if the divine person was not the “Son” prior to the economic working in time, then the divine person did mutate into the son. Aseity is, “that God is independent and entirely self-sufficient, not constituted as God by another.”[15] God is not “constituted” as God. If each person has his own center of consciousness, then God certainly constituted by another—each distinct person. Rather, each person is fully God, not a part of him, and together have all three persons have one will, one love, one intellect.
The social Trinity purposefully erases the distinctions between the intrinsic and economic Trinity (following Rahner’s Rule). Craig states, “The one spiritual being which is God possesses three distinct sets of cognitive faculties each sufficient for self-consciousness, intentionality, and volition, and so for personhood, wholly apart from the intra-Trinitarian relations.”[16] This view of the social Trinity says the economic Trintiy grounds what the persons are apart from the intrinsic. The unity of the intrinsic seems superficial under the term “one spiritual being.”
Unity and simplicity maintain the distinction between the economic and intrinsic Trinity. Stephen Duby writes, “To confirm that Christ is fully God. . .requires the observation that Christ (or any divine person) does not have part of—does not participate in—a deity that, as a composite whole, would be greater than Christ’s deity. . .”[17] If one person has just one of three wills, intellects, or centers of conscious then that one person does not have what it means to be “fully God.” Furthermore, if God’s essence is a composite of three wills or intellects then what one person has is less than what the essence is. The social Trinity cannot consistently hold to intrinsic divine simplicity.
Most strikingly of all, the social Trinity destroys the unity of God. Classically, distinguishing the person by their eternal relations allows for this unity of “same nature.” However, applying a modern term of person and distinguishing those persons ontologically destroys the nature. The classically defended homoousios has to be traded in for homoiousios. Craig writes, “the persons of the ontological Trinity can be as similar to one another as three distinct persons can be, knowing, willing, and loving the same things.” Similar nature is not same nature.
Conclusion
The doctrine of the Trinity contains mystery, but that mystery is definable. Making trinitarian propositions is possible, as is knowing where the finite mind cannot go. The social Trinity attempts to make sense of the intrinsic, eternal persons by use of their economic work in time. The social Trinity fails in its approach to Scripture because it imports ontological falsehood into the biblical data by assuming a modern, univocal definition of personhood which it applies to the Trinity. It also distorts clear, historic attributes of God.
Because of this, the social Trinity has a poor definition of the oneness of God. Being, substance, essence, whatever term that is used to describe the oneness of God is closely defined with the social Trinity’s definition of person. For example, Craig uses Cerberus, the three-headed dog as what he believes to be a proper analogy for the Trinity because he has purposely given up the doctrine of divine simplicity. He names one of the heads “Spike” and argues, “If Hercules were attempting to enter Hades, and Spike snarled at him or bit his leg, he might well report, ‘Cerberus snarled at me’ or ‘Cerberus attacked me.’” In this analogy, God’s action is only defined in the single person’s action. God as being does nothing.
The social Trinity definitionally destroys what it means for God to be God. It takes away from a proper approach to Scripture because it anachronistically applies a modern semantic range to a word that did not ever have that when originally used of the “threeness” in God. The social Trinity should not be seen as a viable, biblical model for the Trinity.
[1] Michael Scott Horton, The Christian Faith : A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2011), 283.
[2] Sanders, The Triune God, 141.
[3] Sanders, The Triune God, 141.
[4] Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity¸8-9.
[5] Homes, The Quest for the Trinity, 9.
[6] Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity, 32.
[7] Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity, 32.
[8] Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity, 17.
[9] William Lane Criag, “A Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity,” Reasonable Faith, n.d., https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/christian-doctrines/a-formulation-and-defense-of-the-doctrine-of-the-trinity.
[10] Gregg Allison, Historical Theology: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2011), 372.
[11] R B Jamieson, The Paradox of Sonship : Christology in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Downers Grove, Il: IVP Academic, 2021), 66.
[12] Jamieson, The Paradox of Sonship, 148.
[13] Stephen S. Smalley, Word Biblical Commentary : 1, 2, 3 John, ed. David A. Hubbard, Glenn W. Barker, and Ralph P. Martin, vol. 51 (Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1984), 241.
[14] Craig, “A Foundation and Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity.” This is stated towards the end of the article.
[15] Duby, Jesus and the God of Classical Theism, 25.
[16] Craig, “A Foundation and Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity.”
[17] Steven J Duby, Jesus and the God of Classical Theism (Baker Academic, 2023), 66.